Surveillance and Government Feature
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officers and provides the only
independent oversight of what’s arguably
the largest non-military database in
existence across Western Europe.
Democratic oversight
Importantly, each element of the
National Surveillance Camera Strategy is
supported by a delivery plan. For the
first time, I’ve also ensured democratic
oversight of the work this industry has
been doing by producing an Annual
Report to Parliament. This is visible to
our elected representatives and, in turn,
the general public at large.
To complement that work, my team
has produced a series of blogs outlining
the successes and failures of my past
seven years. The series provides a
commentary on the state of surveillance
here in the UK, the law that governs it
and regulation that exists to provide
reassurance to members of the public
that surveillance cameras are there to
support them, not spy on them.
It’s important that I recognise the
assistance afforded to me throughout
my terms in office by many unsung
heroes. This magnificent industry which
supported the development of the
certification processes, the Inspectorates
who helped develop the oversight (ie the
NSI, the SSAIB and IQ Verify) and,
indeed, the media outlets who’ve both
supported and challenged my messages
have all been invaluable.
Providing leadership free of charge,
the senior leads and experts on the
National Surveillance Camera Strategy
have helped me turbocharge a small
office into a mini powerhouse punching
well above its weight and in ways that
have provided leadership and oversight
to a complex industry. Finally, grateful
thanks go to my small team led by the
irrepressible Mick Kelly (head of policy
and support) whom many of you will
know (because he will have contacted
you asking to take on an onerous piece
of work, free of charge, at an impossible
timescale). Mick has now moved on to a
new role supporting the Director of
Science at the Home Office.
Merger plans
As I write, the Government is
proceeding with its plans to merge the
role of Biometric Commissioner with
that of my office. I have concerns that
this is the wrong plan at the wrong time.
These areas of discipline enjoy little
overlap, while both are experiencing
huge uplifts in issues. We only have to
look at the civil liberty issues emerging
from the COVID-19 era where, it could
be argued, civil liberties hang by a
damask thread. The public supports
difficult decisions being made in its
name, but also expects – and, quite
rightly, demands – transparency,
openness and honesty at those times
when privacy rights are infringed.
In short, then, my world has been
challenging, exciting and very enjoyable,
but at times frustrating and damn
difficult. Given that my world has
focused on advancing technology, new
surveillance platforms and algorithms
which have challenged the very essence
of our democracy, I feel it’s something of
an indictment that, despite regular calls
from my office and other serious and
influential commentators for the
Surveillance Camera Code of Practice to
be updated, it has remained unchanged.
The Code specifically states: ‘If
followed, the Code ensures surveillance
cameras are used to protect
communities, not spy on them’. We need
to examine this statement closely and ask
the question: ‘Has this been achieved?’
The Code was an excellent document
when introduced back in 2013. It set out
the Government’s standard for the
operation of surveillance camera
systems by the police service and local
authorities. It has also been influential in
driving up standards in the private
sector. It hasn’t been updated since its
introduction, though. Indeed, the Code
– which is the Government’s benchmark
standard for state operation of overt
surveillance cameras bursting with new
technology – was published at a time
when the most up-to-date iPhone on the
market was the iPhone 5. This is despite
recommendations I made in 2016
following a comprehensive review carried
out by my office for the Code’s renewal.
The Home Office committed to
updating the Code in its Biometrics
Strategy published in June 2018. This
has yet to materialise. The Biometrics
Strategy also committed to consider
governance structures to take into
account the phenomena of biometric
usage in surveillance. On many
occasions, I’ve stated that modern
surveillance in use by the police is, in
fact, progressively an investigatory tool.
In the aforementioned series of blogs, I
lay out the argument for greater judicial
oversight of this technology.
Automatic Facial Recognition
Many of Security Matters’ readers will
be aware that, in June this year, the
Court of Appeal considered the legality
of the use of Automatic Facial
Recognition technology by the South
Wales Police. In essence, the Court
found that its use was unlawful on the
grounds that it was not conducted ‘in
accordance with the law’, it did not
effectively comply with its obligations to
conduct a comprehensive Data
Protection Impact Assessment and nor
did it follow the requirements under the
Public Sector Equality Duty.
This decision will have ramifications
for the video surveillance industry, but
in my view they will not be fatal. The
Court was quite specific that the legality
of its use revolves around the
requirements for stricter guidelines on
the production of watch lists and where
the equipment can be used.
What frustrates me is that the police
service would have been better served
had the Home Office followed my
advice and provided an updated version
of the Code. This would have
incorporated guidance on watch lists,
authorisation processes and location use
and it’s more than likely that the police
would have been complying with the
law. I am, however, updating police
guidelines to further support the police
in their endeavours and will publish this
document in late November.
Belatedly, the Home Office is now
hurrying to provide the update that I’ve
been urging for the past several years.
Better late than never, but I fear much
public money could have been saved if
What frustrates me is that the police
service would have been better
served had the Home Office
followed my advice and provided an
updated version of the Code
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